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IN THE

SUPR.EME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintif!-Respondent,
vs.
GEORGE WILLIAM JACKSON,
Defendant-Appellant.

Case No.

11340

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On January 5, 1968, a Comp1aint was filed before the
City Court of Salt Lake City, charging the Defendanrt,
George William Jackson wi:fu first degree murder of one
Willie Henry Watson on January 4, 1968. Thereafter and
on or about the 29th day of February, 1968, 'the Defendant
was committed to the Third District Court by Information
and formally 'accused of the crime of murder in the first
degree.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
After four days of trial commencing on 1Jhe 2nd day
of April, 1968, and terminating on the 6th day of April,
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1968, the jury returned a verdict finding the Defendant,
George William Jackson, guilty of murder in the second
degree.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
By this appeal, the Defendant-Appellant, George William Jackson, seeks reversal of the conviction and remand
for a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The eye-witness testimony adduced by the State in the
trial below showed the following:
That several months prior to January 4, 1968, the
Defendant, a 78 year old man, and the deceased, Willie
Henry W,atson, also sometimes known as the Reverend
Watson, had formed a business partnership (Tr. 273-274).
That the Defendant had been the sole economic contributor
to the partnership and that the deceased had brought nothing into the union (Tr. 274-277). 'Tihat during the month
or so prior to January 4, 1968, disputes had arisen between
Defendant and deceased as to the application of proceeds
from the partnership by the deceased, (Tr. 277-278), the
personal conduct of the deceased (Tr. 288-290), and viarious matters relating to the operation of the business (Tr.
279). That the deceased, several days prior to January
4, 1968, had informed the Defendant of his intentions to
dissolve the partnership and force the Defendant to vacate
the premises empty handed (Tr. 282-284).
1.
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2. That on the 4th day of January, 1968, after having
been involved in growing dispute, the Defendant purchased
a hand-gun and returned to ithe business premises late in
the afternoon (Tr. 292-293). That at or about 5 :30 on the
afternoon of the 4th, one Ernest Groce, Alvin Johnson, and
Samuel Ledbetter had come in the &tore for the purpose
of playing pool (Tr. 275). That at or a:bout that rtime both
the Defendant and Mr. Watson were on the premises, that
Mr. Watson had proceeded to the front of the store to sit
at his desk and that rthe Defendant had .gone back to a
closet in the rear of the store (Tr. 227). That the Defendant proceeded from the closet at the rear of the store up
to rthe front of the store while Groce, Johnson, and Ledbetter engaged in a conversation and prepared to play pool
(Tr. 226-227).
3. That Groce, Johnson, and Ledbetter heard a loud
noise and turned to observe the Defendant with a pistol in
hand, firing at the deceased (Tr. 212-213, 227, 238). That
the Defendant fired five or six shots at the deceased, and
that the deceased slumped in the chair in whkh he was
sitting (Tr. 215, 227, 149).
4. That the Defendant then turned and proceeded
across the room to his desk where he sat without saying a
word until the arrival of the Salt Lake City police (Tr.
227).
5. Thrut upon the arrival of the Salt Lake City police,
the Defendant admitted in their presence and in the presence of several passers-by that he had indeed shot Willie
Watson (Tr. 138, 143, 198).
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The Defendant, rtestifying in his own behalf, stated
that he had killed Willie Watson, but that he did so in selfdefense, the deceased having first puHed a gun on the Defendant (Tr. 300-301}. Testimony was adduced on behalf
of the Defendant showing that the deceased, Willie W artson,
was a man of violence (Tr. 285-286, 287), that he had
argued with and had threatened the Defendant (Tr. 280).,
that he had from time to time carried 2. gun on his person
(Tr. '284-285), that he had previously made threatening
gestures toward the Defendant, (Tr. 280), and that the
Defendant had reason to fear for his safety (Tr. 280). No
gun belonging to the deceased was ever found (Tr. 185,
223).
The testimonial evidence indisputably and rather conclusively showed thart on or about the 4th day of January,
1968, bhe Defendant, George WiHiam Jackson killed Willie
Henry Watson, (Tr. 212-213, 227, 228); that the Defendant
intended to inflict bodily harm upon Willie Henry Watson
by his act (Tr. 300-302); thaJ'c such kiliing was of an unlawful nature (Tr. 331); thait said Willie Henry Watson
died within one year and a day after the cause of death was
administered, the said acts causing the death having occurred in Sal.t Lake County, State of Utah (Tr. 189-192).
There remained in balance the questions: Whether the
killing was done with or without malice or upon a sudden
quarrel or in the heat of passion and whether and to whwt
extent the Defendant had acted in self-defense, and the
evidence was sufficient to carry the jury either way.
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With its case in such a strong position, the State then
elected to place irrto evidence, not one, but four photographs
of the deceased taken from various positions and showing
various amounts of blood and gore (see E:Jehibits 2, 3, 4,
and 8). Two of the photographs were color slides reflected
off a screen for the jury to see (Exhibits 2 and 3).
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING
THE STATE TO PUT MULTIPLE PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE DECEASED AT THE TIME
OF HIS DEATH INTO EVIDENCE AND THE
DEFENDANT WAS PREJUDICED THEREBY.
The position of the Defendant on this appeal might
have been entirely different had the Prosecution, with its
overwhelming case against the Defendant, elected not to
place into evidence photographs of the deceased taken at
the scene of the crime. Nor would the Defendant now be
able to compl ain so loudly had the State chosen only to put
into evidence a single black and white photograph of
the scene showing items somewhat probative, releviant,
and necessary to the State's case. This, however, is
not what the Prosecution elected to do, and it is apparent
from a ciasmd examinakion of Exhibits 2, 3, 4, and 8 and
the transcript herein that the prosecutor was not satisfied
with merely resting a conviction of the Defendant on the
State's srtrong and conclusive testJimonial evidence. Rather
the District Attorney was apparently compelled to offer
1

6
and have received ghoulish photographs of the deceased,
the real purpose of which was neither probative of any
issue nor relevant as an aid to the jury, but to inffame,
anger, and arouse the jury to the point where they would
infer malice, pre-meditrution and deliberation on the part
of the Defendant.
It was admitted toot the deceased had been moved

prior to the taking of the pictures (Tr. 158-159).
Exhibit 8 alone would have been sufficient to illustrate
for the jury the scene of the crime and the surroundings in
which it took place, if that had been necessary in light of
the diagrams and other photographs in evidence (see Exhibits 5, 6, 7, 9, 10 and 11), but without trepidation, the
Prosecution also offered Exhibit 4 which, even though a
black and white photograph, grimly portrayed rthe deceased
as he sat slouched in a chair, drenched in his own blood.
To cinch the ma!bter, the Prosecution offered Exhibits 2
and 3, vividly colored slides, which when flashed upon a
screen before the jury could only provoke horror on their
part at the scene projected before them - and each scene
cumulatively showing the deceased from only slightly different positions and angles. Even assuming that the photographs of the deceased were evidence of some element of
the offense, not otherwise provided by the overwhelming
testimonial evidence of the State, the photographs were
cumulative and repetitious and thus calculated only to
shock and excite the jury.
1

It is submitted that these photographs do not iIIus-

trate the depravity of the Defendant's aot; do not give proof
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of malice, pre-meditation or deliberation - the tortured
body of the deceased would have looked as badly if he had
been accidentally shot or shot in the heait of passion or
upon a sudden quarrel; do not prove that the deceased was
killed or that the Defendant kiUed him - the State had conclusive eye-witness testimonial evidence of those facts; do
not prove that the Deceased died as a result of the wounds
inflicted upon him, for the StaJte's medical testimony carried this before the jury unrefuted; do not show either
motive or modus operandi.
They are only ghoulish portrayals of a man, sitting in
a chair dripping with his own blood. Never has the State
gone so far with such repetitiously grisley evidence to prove
so little.
This Court has recently discussed the use of such
photographs in the cases of State vs. Poe, 21 Utah 2d 113,
441 P. 2d 512, and State vs. Renzo, 21 Utah 2d 205, 443
P. 2d 392. While the Court reached opposite results in
each case, it is clear that in the Poe case, the photographs
had no probative value while in the Renzo case this Court
determined that the photographs in question, while gruesome, were otherwise competent and relevant.
In State vs. Poe, supra, it was clear, and the Court
found that "All the material facts which conclusively have
been adduced from a viewing of the slides and been established by the uncontradicted lay and medical tstimony"
515, 441 P. 2d.
In State vs. Renzo, supra, the majority opinion held
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that, while it was a matter of discretion with the Trial
Judge to determine whether the probative value of the picture in question out-weighed their prejudicial affect, this
was, nonetheless, the test and was satisfied. 399, 443 P. 2d.
And Chief Justice Crockett in his concurring opinion,
stated at 400, 443 P. 2d:
"The question of admissability of evidence is dependent, among other things, on the issues in dispute and upon which proof is required. In that regard there is a vital difference between the Poe
case and the instant one. In the Poe case, there was
no question whatever as to whether the deceased
was ,shot with intent to kill or as to where or how
he was shot. The question was whether the Defendant shot him. The facts as to where and how the
deceased was shot were not only uncontested but
were amply iHustrated by certain black and white
pictures taken at the scene ... This lack of probative purpose, coupled with the fact that there was a
definite likelihood that they would have the affect
of suggesting brutality in the crime, and thus provoking resentment and inflaming the passions of
the jury against the accused, (which likelihood incidentally appears to have been borne out by the
verdict) , lead us to believe that it was prejudicial
error to admit the pictures in the Poe case.
"By way of contrast: In the instant case there was
a dramaticaHy different situation. The death came
about as a result of an orgy of drinking and fighting and a great deal of physical violence. There
were critical questions as to whether there had
been any attempt to kill, and as to the cause of
death. On those issues the picture objected to in
this case were probative as to acts committed by the
Defendant upon the victim."
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In this case, there is no question whartever as to
whether the deceased was shot with an intent to kill or as
to where and how he was shot. Nor is there any question
as to whether rthe Defendant short the deceased. The only
question is as :to the mens rea of the crime. On that question,
the State's testimonial evidence was more than sufficient to
support findings on the part of the jury that the Defendant's aot was premedirta:ted and deliberate. On the other
side, the Defendant's testimonial evidence was sufficient to
support a finding on the part of the jury that the killing
was done without malice and upon a sudden quarrel or in
the heat of passion. W~th the case in thait precarious balance, the jury should have had the opportunity to make its
determination without the taint of a series of photographs
having no relevance or probative value and calculated only
to arouse their wrath.
Moreover, the Disrtriot Attorney apparently could not
withstand the irresistable impulse of utilizing one of the
colored slides in his closing argument (Tr. 442-443) . And
for what purpose? To illustrate something which the photograph itself, upon examination, does not even show, i.e.,
the point of impact of the bullets (Tr. 443). In fact, in
order for the District Attorney to illustrate the location of
the entrance wounds, he had to then refer to Exhibit 22, a
free-hand drawing which lacked any of the gorey and dramatic effect and impact that Exhibit 2 necessarily had in
a closing argument (Tr. 443).
It is not urged or contended on this appeal that su~h
photographs as are here involved would not be admissable
Where their probative value outweighs the danger of preju-
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dice to the Defendant. People vs. Sanchez, 423 P. 2d 800
(Calif., 1967). Born vs. State, 397 P. 2d 924 (Okla. 1964).
State vs. Poe, supra.
But it is urged that they had abso lutely no probative
value to any matter in issue and hence there is notthing in
the balance against which to weigh their prejudicial effect.
Exhi Mt 8 was identified as "A photograph ,taken at the
scene of the victim in the chair." "Which fairly depicts
Mr. Watson in the position" first observed (Tr. 148). Exhibit No. 3 was "A photograph taken of the scene, also, of
the victim", which "fairly depicts the victim in the particuliar area ... " (Tr. 148). Exhibit 3 was further identified
as "Another picture of Mr. Watson sitting in his chair"
(Tr. 154). Exhibit 2 was identified as "Another picture of
Mr. Watson leaning backwards in his chair with his head
close to the North wait" It was furither identified as being
"At a different angle than the previous one you just identified [Exhibit 3]" (Tr. 155). Exhibit 2 was described as
"Another photogmph taken to the right of Mr. Watson,
just at a different angle than ·the previous one" (Tr. 159).
Exhibit No. 8 was identified as a "Photograph showing Mr.
Watson behind his desk" which "fairly depicts that particular area ... " (Tr. 171).
1

1

Again, as to Exhibit 2, the prosecutor corutinued:
"Q. Now, inviting your attention rto what appears
to be a swollen area there, can you describe that for

us as it appeared to you?"

"A. Yes. There was a small laceration wt about
this point where you see the bulge on the right side
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of his temple or right side on the top part of his
cheek" (Tr. 159).
There was no further testimony to connect the "small
lacerwtion" to the cause of death or to identify it further.
Exhibit 2 was flashed on the screen in front of the
jury during a description of the bullet wounds, a fadt
which does not appear from the Exhibit itself (Tr. 160,
Exhibit 2). Subsequently, precisely the same facts were
adduced, and apparently in a manner more saitisfactory to
the District Attorney, by Exhibit 22, a free-hand drawing
(Tr. 180-184). Exhibit 22 clearly shows the bullet wounds
- Exhibit 2 shows nothing in that regard. Stated simply,
the faet is that Exhibit 2 simply did not have sufficient
probative value in illustrating the bu1'let wounds when
w~ighed against the danger of prejudice to the Defenjant.
It is not clear from the transcript for what purpose
Exhibiits 3, 4, and 8 were offered, but it is clear that they
added nothing to the proof of the State's case.

The Defendant submits that when the probative value
of the photographs does not outweigh danger of prejudice
to the Defendant, this Court must, as it did in the Poe case,
reverse and remand for a new trial.
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER
OF LAW IN FAILING TO WEIGH PROBATIVE
VALUE OF THE PHOTOGRAPHS AGAINST
THE DANGER OF PREJUDICE TO
DEFENDANT.
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At no poinrt Joes it appear in the record that the Court
below made any effort or attempt to weigh the probative
value of the subject photographs in resolving any material
issue as against the danger of prejudice to the Defendant.
Indeed, the Court did not even indicate for the record the
basis upon which it received the photogmphs into evidence.
It is clear from the cases of State vs. Poe, supra, and
State vs. Renzo, supra, that before such photographs can
be admitted into evidence before the jury, an inirtia:l determination must be made to determine whether their probative value with respect to a fact in issue outweighs their
inflammatory nature. That these photographs totally lacked
probative value, as now can clearly be seen with the advantageous aid of a hindsight review of the record, merely
serves to emphasize the total failure of the Trial Court to
make its preliminary determination.

In a case nota:bly similar to the present case, the California Supreme Court held in People vs. Ford, 388 P. 2d
892, (Calif. 1964), that rthe Trial Court abused its discretion as a matter of law in failing to weigh the probative
value of photographs of the Deceased against the danger
of prejudice to the Defendant. Reversing the conviction,
the Court said at 911, 388, P. 2d:
"Defendant contends that the Court abused its discretion in receiving into evidence six photographs
of the body of the victim ait the scene of the shooting. It is urged that the photographs are gruesome
and inflammatory, and that as they are 'essentially
identical' no more than one should have been admitted in any event. In the circumstances, we need
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neither view these photographs nor determine
whether their admission was prejudicial, for it appears on the face of the record that the Trial Court
prima facie abused its discretion as a matter of Law
in failing to weigh the probative value of the photographs in resolving a material issue as against the
danger of prejudice to the Defendant through the
needless arousal of the passions of the jurors. (Ci1Jaitions.) Misapprehension of the law in this respect
appears to be indicated by rulings on several of the
challenged photographs : As to one (Ex. 23) the
Court recognized 'it might tend to be prejudicial' but
nevertheless ruled that 'as long as it is material
and shows the deceased after the incident, it is
material and wiU go in on that basis'; as to another
(Ex. 24} the Court reiterated, 'Different angle, it
is material; as long as it is material it can go in.'
. . . If these photographs are offered on re-trial, it
will be the duty of the Court to determine their admissability in accordance with the above stated
rule of Law and to make the fact apparent in the
record." (Emphasis is the Court's.)
It is submitted that when this Court wrote the Poe
decision, it intended that itts holding thereiP- should be
binding upon Trial Courts in situations where potential'ly
inflmnmatory photographs were offered into evidence. It
is further submitted that the Poe decision requires not
only that Trial Courts exercise sound discretion in this
area, but that it also places an onus upon the prosecutors to
exercise some judgment in their zealous and fervent preparation and presentation to such cases tu the jury. To the
extent that the Poe case sets up guidelines for the Trial
Court, it also sets them up for the prosecutors and their
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flailure to observe those guidelines, particularly in capital
cases, cannort and should not be lightly absolved. If there
is any uncertainty in the minds of the Trial Courts or the
p:riosecutors as to the meaning and affect of the Poe case
and the Renzo ca:se, and as to the prosecutors there apparently is, such uncertainty shouid be quickly dispelled.
And surely such uncertainty should not be permitted to
inure to the detriment of this Defendant whose age, now
79, makes the distinction between second degree murder
and V'Oluntary manslaughter of critical import. As stated
in the Poe case at 515, 441 P. 2d:
"It could very wel'l be that the jury would have returned the s ame verdidt absent its view of the slides.
However, with the Defendant's life is at stake, this
Court should not hazard a guess. The slides could
very wel'l tipped the scale in favor of the death
penalty."
1

1

Likewise, the photogr:aphs here could well have tipped the
scales in favor of a conviction of second degree murder as
opposed ito a conviction of voluntary manslaughter or an
acquit1Jal, and the failure of the Trial Court to weigh probative value against prejudicial effect constitutes reversable error.
POINT III.
THE FAILURE OF DEFENDANT'S COUNSEL
AT TRIAL TO OBJECT TO THE ADMISSION
OF THE PHOTOGRAPHS IS NOT FATAL TO
DEFENDANT'S APPEAL.
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It is not disputed that Defendant's counsel in the trial
below failed to object to the admission of the taintej pho'llographs except in one instance, as to Exhibit 4, and as to
that on the ground that it was "deplicitous", "prt!judicial"
and "inflammatory" (Tr. 173). Under similar circumstances, th:is court said in State vs. Poe, supra, at 515, 441
P.2d:
"The counsel for Defendant did not make the proper
objection to the admission of the slides. However,
this Court will not all~w such a technicality to influence its decision in a case such as this."
If this Court finds, as it Jid in the Poe case, that the probative value of the photographs in question did not out~igh their inflammatory and prejudicial nature, then this
Court is compelleJ, as it was in the Poe case to reverse and
remand in spite of insufficient timely objection by counsel.
That approach in the Poe case, and the utilization of that
approach here accords with this Court's statement in State
vs. Cobo, 90 Utah 89, 60 P. 2d 952, wherein at 9'58, 60 P.
2d it was held:

"We wish not to depart from the rule laid down in
this jurisdiction that in ordinary cases on appeal
errors relating to instructions or refusing requests
to instruct will not be considered or reviewed uil'less
exceptions thereto were properly taken by the party
complaining. Bult in capital cases and in cases of
grave and serious charged offenses and convictions
of long terms of imprisonment, cases inV'Olving tJhe
life and liberty of the citizen, we think that when
palpable error is made to appear on the face of the
record and to manifest prejudice of the accused, the
Court has the power to notice such error and to
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correct the same, though no formal exception was
taken to the ruling. In these days of widespread
advocacy of reformed procedure in criminal cases
to heal and cure misgivings and faulty prosecutions,
the safeguards of the rights and privileges of the
accused should not be overlooked and a loose rein
held fur the prosecution and a tight, technical, and
resfric.ted rein helJ on the accused."
CONCLUSION
The photographs of the deceased utilized by the Prosecution in this ca:se serve no probative purpose. They prove
nothing that was not indisputably shown by the testimonial
evidence of the Sta,te. But their lack of probative purpose
did not render them :ineffectual for the jury that convicted
Defendant of second degr€€ murder. The prejudicial failure of the Trial Court to weigh these photographs may well
have resulted in the impassioned failure of the jurJ bo return a finding of not guility or guilty of voluntary manslaughter. This Defendant earnestly prays that the Court
exorcise tthe taint of this conviction and remand for new
tri'al.
Respectfully submi'bted,

STEWART M. HANSON, JR.
520 Kearns Building

Sa!lt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Defendant

